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AMBRO, Circuit Judge
Petitioner Vadim Kaplun, a citizen of the Ukraine,
petitions for review of four decisions of the Board of
Immigration Appeals resulting in a final order of removal that
designated him removable for having committed an aggravated
felony, denied him withholding of removal by virtue of having
committed a particularly serious crime, and reviewed de novo
and reversed the Immigration Judge’s finding of a clear
probability of future torture if Kaplun were removed. He
contends that the Government did not prove he committed an
aggravated felony by clear and convincing evidence; as a nonviolent, white collar offense, his offense was not a particularly
serious crime; and the BIA applied an improper de novo
standard of review to the IJ’s finding that Kaplun’s torture if
removed would be probable. We conclude that the BIA was
correct on the first two issues, but applied an incorrect standard
of review on the third. Accordingly, we deny the petition for
review on the first two claims, and grant it on the third claim.
I.

Facts and Procedural History
A.

Kaplun’s background

Kaplun is a native of the Ukraine who was admitted to
the United States in 1977 as a seven-year-old refugee. He later
became a legal permanent resident. In 1997 and 1998 he was
charged and convicted in two federal criminal proceedings
based on his participation in fraudulent stock schemes.
3

For reasons we describe below, only the 1998 conviction
is at issue here. Kaplun there pled guilty to an information1
alleging securities fraud with losses of nearly $900,000 under 15
U.S.C. §§ 77q, 77x, and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Per the pre-sentence
investigation report (PSR), the total loss for the 1998 offense
was described as “at least $700,000 and less than $1,000,000.”
The $700,000 figure was used twice more in the PSR to
calculate the specific offense level2 and to calculate the
maximum fine. Defense counsel made no objection to the PSR.
After the District Court adopted the PSR (save for two
exceptions not relevant here) and granted a downward departure,
the undisputed Guideline range was 51–63 months’
imprisonment.
Kaplun was sentenced to 56 months’
imprisonment for the 1998 conviction, but a fine was waived
because of his inability to pay.
B.

Removal proceedings before the Immigration
Judge

1

Kaplun waived indictment and consented to proceeding
by information.
2

From 1987 to 2001, the United States Sentencing
Commission Guidelines Manual had specific provisions for
fraud offenses in § 2F1.1. Subsection 2F1.1(b)(1)(K) assigned
a 10-level increase for fraud offenses with a loss of more than
$500,000. This was used in Kaplun’s PSR. U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1
has since been repealed.
4

The Government began removal proceedings against
Kaplun in 2001 based on the 1997 and 1998 convictions. He
denied removability and later submitted an application for
asylum. The Government produced the judgment of conviction,
the PSR, and the information to establish the 1998 conviction
and its surrounding facts. No plea colloquy was produced,
though Kaplun does not deny that he pled guilty to the singlecount information.
In his application for asylum, Kaplun claimed that, as a
Jewish refugee, he would be subjected to persecution and torture
if he were removed to the Ukraine. In support of his claims, he
procured an expert witness to give testimony on anti-Semitism
in the Ukraine. This expert gave detailed testimony on the
situation and voiced disagreement with various Government
reports on the extent of anti-Semitism in that country. He also
testified that Kaplun would be unable to gain citizenship, get a
job, rent an apartment, or even buy a train ticket. It was his
expert opinion that Kaplun would be living on the street,
destitute, and would be targeted for extortion and torture.
In an April 2004 ruling, the IJ found Kaplun removable
based on his prior convictions (though it was unclear which of
the two convictions qualified), but granted withholding of
removal and protection under the United Nations Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
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Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”),3 crediting the testimony of
Kaplun’s expert. Despite this, Kaplun appealed the part of the
ruling that found him removable. The Government crossappealed the part of the ruling granting withholding of removal.
C.

The BIA’s first ruling

The first ruling by the Board of Immigration Appeals was
issued in November 2004. It held that the IJ erred in his
removal findings by inadvertently relying on the wrong record
of conviction, and it vacated the IJ decision and remanded for a
determination of whether Kaplun was indeed removable as
charged under either the 1997 or the 1998 conviction.
D.

The Immigration Judge responds

The IJ issued a second ruling in February 2006, in which
he went through the removability charges in great detail. He
concluded that the sole sustainable removal charge was the 1998
fraud conviction. The basis for this decision was Kaplun’s
conviction for an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) (“an offense that . . . involves fraud or
deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds
3

Technically a CAT claim is a claim under the Foreign
Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act, but we use the
convention adopted in our Circuit and refer to it as a CAT claim.
See Pierre v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 180, 186 n.5 (3d Cir. 2008)
(en banc).
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$10,000”). The IJ then certified the case and sent the matter
back to the BIA for resolution of the remaining issues on
appeal—namely, removability and the prior grant of relief from
removal under the CAT.
E.

The BIA’s second ruling

The BIA issued a second decision in August 2006. It
addressed the following: (1) whether the removability charge
was sustainable based on the 1998 conviction; (2) whether that
1998 conviction was a particularly serious crime rendering
Kaplun statutorily ineligible for withholding of removal, or in
the alternative whether Kaplun met his burden of proof of
establishing eligibility for withholding of removal; and (3)
whether the IJ erred in finding that Kaplun had met his burden
of proving probability of torture under the CAT. The BIA
concluded that Kaplun was removable on the basis of the 1998
conviction, that it was a “particularly serious crime” (thereby
declining to address the alternative argument), and that the IJ
erred in granting relief under the CAT. It thus ordered Kaplun
removed to the Ukraine.
He filed a petition for review of the final order of
removal in August 2006. We did not rule on the petition at that
time.
F.

The BIA issues a third ruling denying a motion
to reopen

7

In November 2006, Kaplun filed a motion with the BIA
to reopen his case based on our decision in Alaka v. Attorney
General, 456 F.3d 88, 108 (3d Cir. 2006) (in determining a loss
amount for 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), “we look only to the
charges to which the petitioner pled guilty, and not to conduct
that was neither admitted nor proven beyond a reasonable
doubt”). In February 2007, the BIA denied the motion to reopen
because it concluded that Alaka was factually distinguishable.
Kaplun then filed a petition for review with our Court in
February 2007. On motion of the Government, we remanded
Kaplun’s 2007 petition, along with his 2006 petition, to the BIA
in September 2007. We asked for a determination of whether
the BIA had authority
to reverse the immigration judge’s determination
that “there [was] a preponderance of evidence in
the record leading to a justification for a clear
probability finding that this particular respondent
. . . is likely to be targeted [for mistreatment,] at
least in part, by both governmental and nongovernmental entities within the Ukraine should
he be removed to that country . . . [and that such
mistreatment will rise to the level of torture.]”
G.

The BIA’s fourth ruling

In May 2008, the BIA issued a precedential decision
answering the question on remand. Matter of V–K–, 24 I & N
8

Dec. 500 (BIA 2008). It held that it had the authority to review
the IJ’s determination de novo, and it reasoned as follows:
We now clarify that while we reviewed the
Immigration Judge’s factual rulings for clear
error, we do not consider a prediction of the
probability of future torture to be a ruling of
“fact.” Although predictions of future events may
in part be derived from “facts,” they are not the
sort of “[f]acts determined by the Immigration
Judge” that can only be reviewed for clear error.
....
Accordingly, we conclude that an Immigration
Judge’s prediction or finding regarding the
likelihood that an alien will be tortured may be
reviewed de novo because, like a conclusion
relating to whether a statutorily prescribed chance
of persecution or level of hardship exists, it relates
to whether the ultimate statutory requirement for
establishing eligibility for relief was met and is
therefore a mixed question of fact and law, or a
question of “judgment.”
24 I & N Dec. at 501–02 (alteration in original) (citations
omitted).
Kaplun then filed the petition for review that is before us
9

today, as to which we have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(1).
II.

Standard of Review

When the BIA issues its own decision on the merits and
not a summary affirmance, we review its decision, not that of
the IJ. Sheriff v. Att’y Gen., 587 F.3d 584, 588 (3d Cir. 2009).
As Kaplun is subject to a final order of removal by reason of
having committed an aggravated felony, we review his petition
only to the extent it raises questions of law or constitutional
claims, and purely factual or discretionary determinations are
outside our scope of review. See Pierre v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d
180, 184 (3d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (citing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(C)–(D)).
We review the BIA’s legal
determinations de novo, subject to the principles of deference
articulated in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). Pierre, 528 F.3d at 184; see
also Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2006). The
Board’s interpretation of its own regulation is “controlling
unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’”
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (citations omitted).
III.

Discussion
A.

Kaplun’s 1998 conviction was shown to be an
aggravated felony by clear and convincing
evidence.

10

Kaplun’s first claim stems from his 1998 securities fraud
conviction. He argues that the sole charge of removability
should not have been sustained because the Government did not
prove the $10,000 loss required to qualify as an “aggravated
felony” with clear and convincing evidence. We disagree.
Federal immigration law provides that any “alien who is
convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is
deportable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1127(a)(2)(A)(iii). The list of offenses
that qualify as an “aggravated felony” is given by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43). As noted, § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) makes “an
offense that . . . involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the
victim or victims exceeds $10,000” an aggravated felony.
The Supreme Court has recently clarified the approach
we are to take when determining what evidence can be
consulted to determine whether a crime is an “aggravated
felony” for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). Nijhawan
v. Holder, 557 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2294 (2009). The Court first
determined that this provision “calls for a ‘circumstancespecific,’ not a ‘categorical,’ interpretation.” Id. at 2300. With
regard to the $10,000 figure, “the monetary threshold applies to
the specific circumstances surrounding an offender’s
commission of a fraud and deceit crime on a specific occasion.”
Id. at 2302.
The Court also rejected a “modified categorical
approach,” which would limit the evidence to “a jury verdict, or
a judge-approved equivalent . . . [such as] charging documents,
11

jury instructions, and any special jury finding . . . [, or] written
plea documents or the plea colloquy.” Id. Noting that the
Government was held to a “clear and convincing” burden of
proof (and not “beyond a reasonable doubt”), it found “nothing
unfair about [an IJ] rel[ying] upon earlier sentencing-related
material” (there, a stipulation for sentencing purposes and a
restitution order). Id. It also noted that “the sole purpose of the
aggravated felony inquiry is to ascertain the nature of a prior
conviction; it is not an invitation to relitigate the conviction
itself.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
In our case, the record shows that the IJ was presented
with clear and convincing evidence that Kaplun was convicted
of a fraud crime with a loss exceeding $10,000. Two powerful
and uncontroverted items of evidence establish the amount
clearly and convincingly. The first is the criminal information
to which Kaplun pled guilty, in which he is alleged to have
converted nearly $900,000 of investors’ funds to his personal
use and that of his accomplices. Although no plea colloquy was
produced by the Government or Kaplun, he does not deny
pleading guilty to the information alleging the criminal conduct
involving fraud or deceit.
The PSR is the second piece of evidence establishing a
loss greater than $10,000. At three different points in the PSR,
the loss is alleged to be at least $700,000. First, in the “Offense
Conduct” section, the loss resulting from Kaplun’s conduct in
the 1998 conviction is described as follows:

12

As an overview, between late April 1995 and
October 1995, VADIM KAPLUN was involved
in a securities fraud scheme which resulted in a
total loss to over two hundred investors of at least
$700,000 and less than $1,000,000.
Second, in the “Offense Level Computation” section, the loss is
again determined to be greater than $10,000:
Specific Offense Characteristic: This fraud
resulted in a loss of at least $700,000. Pursuant to
Guideline 2F1.1(b)(1)(K), ten levels are added.
U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1) provided a schedule of offense level
enhancements that vary depending on the amount of loss
resulting from the offense, giving the defendant every incentive
to ensure that it is calculated correctly so as to avoid excess
punishment.4 Third, in the “Fines” section, the loss is once
again determined to be greater than $10,000:
Statutory Provisions: . . . For Count One of 98CR-1387 (JGK), pursuant to 18 USC 3571(d), the
maximum fine is $1,400,000, namely twice the
4

For example, subsection (K) provides for ten levels to
be added for a loss greater than $500,000. Subsection (J)
provides for nine levels to be added if the loss is greater than
$350,000 while subsection (L) provides for eleven levels to be
added if the loss is greater than $800,000.
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loss of at least $700,000 caused by Kaplun’s
participation in that fraud scheme.
Kaplun made no objection to the PSR, and save for two
exceptions not related to the loss amount, the District Court
adopted the PSR in its entirety, including its findings of fact.
Like the Supreme Court in Nijhawan, “[w]e can find
nothing unfair about the immigration judge’s having here relied
upon earlier sentencing-related material.” 129 S. Ct. at 2303.
While the Government could have produced a plea colloquy
transcript demonstrating Kaplun’s acceptance of the loss amount
(and Kaplun suggests that we should demand such evidence), in
the face of his guilty plea to the information alleging over
$10,000 in losses, the three uses of a loss amount over $10,000
in the PSR that was adopted by the District Court, the absence
of any objections to the PSR by Kaplun, and “the absence of any
conflicting evidence (and [Kaplun] mentions none), this
evidence is clear and convincing.” Id.
B.

The BIA did not commit legal error when it
determined that Kaplun’s aggravated felony
was a “particularly serious crime”

The BIA found Kaplun ineligible for withholding of
removal because the 1998 conviction was for a “particularly
serious crime.” Removal is withheld if “the alien’s life or
freedom would be threatened in that country because of the
alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
14

social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).
However, this does not apply if “the alien, having been
convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime[,]
is a danger to the community of the United States.” Id.
§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).
“Particularly serious crime” includes an “aggravated
felony (or felonies) for which the alien has been sentenced to an
aggregate term of imprisonment of at least 5 years.” Id.
§ 1231(b)(3)(B). It also provides for a discretionary designation
of “particularly serious crime” when the Attorney General
determines that, no matter how short the sentence, the crime
qualifies as particularly serious. Id. Kaplun was not sentenced
to an aggregate term of at least five years, so we look only to the
discretionary portion of the statute. We do not have jurisdiction
over discretionary decisions, and without any assertion of legal
error, Kaplun is not entitled to relief on this claim.
Kaplun makes three legal arguments why he has not been
convicted of a “particularly serious crime”: (1) the Government
has waived the issue, having not brought it before the IJ; (2) the
“entire analysis . . . rests upon the legally erroneous conclusion
that [his] guilty plea admitted all the allegations in the
information”; and (3) the BIA decision “ran contrary to actual
Board precedent.” We reject all three arguments.
First, Kaplun cites no relevant authority for the
proposition that the Government waives the right to challenge
withholding of removal if it does not bring it before the IJ. The
15

sole authority cited, Tokatly v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 613, 618 (9th
Cir. 2004), does not support that proposition. There, the
Government “waived waiver” by failing to argue to the BIA that
a petitioner had waived an argument, raising the issue for the
first time before the Court of Appeals. This situation is
distinguishable for two reasons: (1) Kaplun himself did not raise
this issue before the BIA; and (2) the Government raised the
issue prior to briefing in the federal courts, having brought it to
the BIA’s attention. We thus decline to hold that the
Government waived the argument here.
Second, we reject Kaplun’s assertion that the entire
analysis rested on a legally erroneous conclusion for the reasons
discussed in Part III.A. The Government has established the
commission of an aggravated felony by clear and convincing
evidence. Nor is there a problem with “tethering,” for the 1998
conviction and loss figure was a result of a single-count
information, and there is no dispute that the entire loss amount
alleged was tied to Kaplun’s guilty plea and conviction. See
Alaka, 456 F.3d at 108 (holding that “the loss amount relevant
to [an alien’s] aggravated felony determination is . . . the loss
suffered by the victim of the count to which [the alien] pled
guilty”). This assertion also fails.
Finally, we reject Kaplun’s contention that the BIA
decision runs contrary to BIA precedent. Citing to a nowsuperseded BIA decision, Matter of Frentescu, 18 I & N Dec.
244 (BIA 1982), he argues that the BIA “has never held that . . .
a non-violent white collar criminal offense could constitute a
16

particularly serious crime.” Kaplun does not point out that
Frentescu’s definition of “particularly serious crime” has been
replaced by the definition in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B). It
includes aggravated felonies with a term of imprisonment of at
least five years, and there are a number of “non-violent white
collar criminal offense[s]” that are aggravated felonies5
punishable by at least five years’ imprisonment. Moreover,
nothing in our precedent suggests that a financial crime cannot,
as a matter of law, be a particularly serious crime.
C.

The BIA applied an incorrect standard of
review to the IJ’s determination that there was
a probability of future torture.

Kaplun’s final claim alleges BIA error in reviewing the
probability of future torture de novo and not under a “clearly
erroneous” standard.
Though the question is not as
straightforward as it first appears, we agree with Kaplun.

5

The list of aggravated felonies in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43) is comprehensive and goes beyond “crimes of
violence” (which are covered by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)).
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(D) (money laundering), (P)
(document fraud), (Q) (failure to appear for service of sentence),
(R) (bribery, counterfeiting, forgery, or trafficking in vehicles
with altered Vehicle Identification Numbers), (S) (obstruction
of justice, perjury, and bribery of a witness), & (T) (failure to
appear pursuant to a court order to answer to or dispose of a
felony).
17

Prior to 2002, the BIA reviewed all aspects of an IJ’s
decision de novo. In August 2002, procedural reforms were
adopted after a period of notice and comment, and codified in
the Code of Federal Regulations. The new rule governing BIA
review now reads:
(d) Powers of the Board—
....
(3) Scope of review. (i) The Board will not
engage in de novo review of findings of fact
determined by an immigration judge. Facts
determined by the immigration judge, including
findings as to the credibility of testimony, shall be
reviewed only to determine whether the findings
of the immigration judge are clearly erroneous.
(ii) The Board may review questions of law,
discretion, and judgment and all other issues in
appeals from decisions of immigration judges de
novo.
8 C.F.R § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)–(ii). If the probability of torture is a
“finding of fact,” the BIA may only review it for clear error, but
if it is a “question of law, discretion, [or] judgment,” the BIA
reviews the IJ’s decision de novo.
Eligibility for withholding of removal under the CAT is
18

governed by 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c). To obtain withholding on
this ground, “[t]he burden of proof is on the applicant . . . to
establish that it is more likely than not that he or she would be
tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8
C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). Here, the BIA concluded that a finding
of a “probability of future torture” was “a mixed question of fact
and law, or a question of ‘judgment,’” subject to de novo
review. 24 I & N Dec. at 502. It reasoned that “[a]lthough
predictions of future events may in part be derived from ‘facts,’
they are not the sort of ‘[f]acts determined by the Immigration
Judge’ that can only be reviewed for clear error.”6 Id. at 501
6

We reject the BIA’s assertion that a “prediction of
future events” is alternatively a “question of judgment” subject
to de novo review. In this context, “judgment” means either the
application of legal standards or the exercise of discretion, and
not a situation where the decision-maker must determine the
likelihood of a future event. Only the legal aspects of judgment
or exercises of discretion, not the findings of fact, receive de
novo review by the BIA. In either case, the BIA must take the
facts as given (unless they are clearly erroneous), and only then
exercise its judgment or discretion whether those facts meet the
particular legal standard under review (e.g., whether the facts
are sufficient to be deemed torture).
This is borne out in the Attorney General’s comments on
the final rule. The Attorney General interpreted the rule to
allow for de novo review of “judgments as to whether facts
established by a particular alien amount to [a legal standard].”
Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms To Improve
19

(alteration in original) (citation omitted). As the Government
notes, the BIA spoke even more forcefully in Matter of A–S–B–,
24 I & N Dec. 493, 498 (BIA 2008), making the blanket
assertion that “it is impossible to declare as ‘fact’ things that
have not yet occurred.”7
For the reasons that follow, insofar as the BIA interpreted
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3) to hold that an IJ’s assessment of the
probability of future torture is not a finding of fact because the
events have not yet occurred, we conclude its interpretation
plainly errs. See Auer, 519 U.S. at 461. Accordingly, it is not
controlling, and to the extent that the BIA relied on this
incorrect statement to justify its interpretation of its own

Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,890 (Aug. 26,
2002). On the topic of discretion to grant relief, the rule was
interpreted to mean that “the ‘discretion,’ or judgment, exercised
based on . . . findings of fact, and the weight accorded to
individual factors, may be reviewed by the Board de novo.” Id.
7

In an opinion published after we heard argument in this
case, the BIA continues to take the stance adopted in Matter of
V–K– and Matter of A–S–B– that likelihoods cannot be “facts”
because they involve future events. See Matter of H–L–H– &
Z–Y–Z–, 25 I & N Dec. 209, 212–13 & n.4 (BIA 2010). To the
extent that A–S–B– and H–L–H– & Z–Y–Z– address the standard
of review applied to an IJ’s determination of a “well-founded
fear of future persecution” in the asylum context (and not a
likelihood of torture), we do not purport to resolve that issue at
this time.
20

regulation governing the standard of review, we reject its
conclusion.
Facts include past events, but they are not restricted to
historical events. See Black’s Law Dictionary 669 (9th ed.
2009) (defining “fact” to mean “something that actually exists;
an aspect of reality,” or “[a]n actual or alleged event or
circumstance, as distinguished from its legal effect,
consequence, or interpretation”; defining “[f]acts” to “include
not just tangible things, actual occurrences, and relationships,
but also states of mind such as intentions and opinions”);
Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 813 (1971) (defining
“fact” as “the quality or character of being actual or of being
made up of facts”; giving as an example “a question of fact
hinges on the actual evidence”). A present probability of a
future event is something “distin[ct] from its legal effect” that is
“made up of facts” and “actually exists” but is “not [a] tangible
thing[], [or] actual occurrence[].” This likelihood, while an
assessment of a future event, is what a decision-maker in an
adjudicatory system decides now as part of a factual framework
for determining legal effect.
For example, that “it took 2 hours to drive the 100 miles
to grandmother’s house last week” may be established and
found as a fact through documentary, testimonial, or other
evidence. A finding of fact may also stem from an assessment
of what is expected to occur in the future. Take, for instance, “It
is likely that it will take less than 3 hours to drive the 100 miles
to grandmother’s house next week.” The likelihood (an
21

inferential fact) may be established through, for example,
testimony of past experience, testimony on typical traffic
conditions, or even expert opinion testimony on traffic patterns.
Of course, to call a likelihood “fact” is not to say that the likely
outcome will necessarily occur, but the likelihood itself remains
a factual finding that can be made ex ante the actual outcome.
Taking another example from the medical malpractice
context, experts frequently testify to their opinions (or
“predictions”) of future disability and future pain and suffering.
When a jury chooses to believe the expert’s predictions, it
makes a factual finding that the plaintiff will be unable to
perform certain tasks in the future and will experience some
degree of pain and suffering. If a patient plaintiff improves, or
dies unexpectedly, we do not say that a jury made a factual
error, nor do we conclude—indeed, it would be too late to do
so—that the expert should not have been found worthy of belief.
The patient plaintiff’s future condition is a factual finding made
by the jury.8

8

Elsewhere outside of the immigration context, we have
held that factual inferences drawn from historical facts
(including the likelihood of future events) are reviewed for clear
error. See United States v. Stewart, 452 F.3d 266, 273 (3d Cir.
2006) (holding that whether the release of an individual, found
not guilty solely by reason of insanity, creates a substantial risk
of future danger to society is a finding of fact reviewed for clear
error); Martin v. Cooper Elec. Supply Co., 940 F.2d 896, 900
(3d Cir. 1991) (“[W]here the district court was required to draw
22

Applied to immigration generally (and specifically this
case), a finding of fact by an IJ includes expressions of
likelihood based on testimony (both lay and expert) and/or
documentary evidence. For example, if an IJ concludes, based
on expert opinion, that “Kaplun is likely to be imprisoned if
removed to the Ukraine,” that finding would be factual and
reviewable only for clear error, even though it is possible that
Kaplun may be removed and yet never imprisoned. If Kaplun
were removed but turned out not to be imprisoned (the likely
outcome did not materialize), it would not change the inquiry
into the likelihood of imprisonment from a question of fact to a
mixed question of law and fact or a question of judgment.
The confusion arises when the question is posed as
whether it is more likely than not that Kaplun would be tortured.
Torture is a term with legal significance. The regulations
outline the evidence to be considered in assessing the possibility
of future torture:
In assessing whether it is more likely than not that
an applicant would be tortured in the proposed
country of removal, all evidence relevant to the
factual inferences from historical facts . . .[,] we review those
inferences for clear error too.”); see also Onishea v. Hopper,
171 F.3d 1289, 1300–01 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding that
a district court’s finding as to the risk of future prison violence
based on conflicting evidence was a factual determination
reviewed for clear error).
23

possibility of future torture shall be considered,
including, but not limited to:
(i)

Evidence of past torture inflicted
upon the applicant;

(ii)

Evidence that the applicant could
relocate to a part of the country of
removal where he or she is not
likely to be tortured;

(iii)

Evidence of gross, flagrant or mass
violations of human rights within
the country of removal, where
applicable; and

(iv)

Other relevant information
regarding conditions in the country
of removal.

8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3).
Here, the BIA noted that there were three likelihoods
involved: “In his decision, the Immigration Judge credited the
testimony of [Kaplun]’s expert witness that [Kaplun] ‘[1] is
likely to need to come into contact with governmental entities
and [2] is likely to be a target for extortion and mistreatment that
[3] is likely to rise to the level of torture.’” 24 I & N Dec. at
501; see also App. 26–27 (IJ Oral Dec.). The BIA treated this
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trio of likelihoods as a single question, namely, whether there
was a clear probability that, if removed, Kaplun would be
tortured in the future.
In the case of the likelihood of torture, there are two
distinct parts to the mixed question: (1) what is likely to happen
to the petitioner if removed; and (2) does what is likely to
happen amount to the legal definition of torture? The two parts
should be examined separately.
The first question is factual. A finding that a petitioner
is likely to be imprisoned (based, for instance, on the evidence
of gross violations of human rights in the country of removal) is
a finding of fact. A finding that a petitioner is likely to be
extorted for vast sums of money if removed (based, for example,
on the testimony of the petitioner and his expert) is also a
finding of fact. So is a finding that a petitioner is likely to be
beaten by government officials based on a finding that the
petitioner was severely beaten in the past. This is to be
distinguished from the legal consequence of those underlying
facts.
The second question, however, is a legal question.
Torture is a term of art, and whether imprisonment, beating, and
extortion are severe enough to rise to the level of torture is a
legal question. While the underlying facts vary from petitioner
to petitioner, the legal question remains the same: do the facts
found by the IJ (and that the BIA determines are not clearly
erroneous) meet the legal requirements for relief under the
25

CAT? This is a question of law where the IJ has no comparative
advantage over the BIA.
Glueing the two questions together, however, does not
entitle the BIA to review the first question, the factual one, de
novo. It must break down the inquiry into its parts and apply the
correct standard of review to the respective components. This
is consistent with the Attorney General’s guidance promulgated
with the 2002 procedural reforms. See Board of Immigration
Appeals: Procedural Reforms To Improve Case Management,
67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,890 (Aug. 26, 2002). There, the
Attorney General gave two examples that were consistent with
this dichotomy between fact and law. The second example,
eligibility for cancellation of removal, is relevant to our inquiry:
Similarly, in cancellation of removal, those facts
that [the alien] claims make up “exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship” to [the alien]’s
putative qualifying relative . . ., and whether the
putative qualifying relative is actually a
qualifying relative, will be reviewed by the Board
only to determine if the immigration judge’s
determination was clearly erroneous. Whether
those facts, as determined by the immigration
judge and found not to be clearly erroneous,
amount to “exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship” . . . may be reviewed by the Board de
novo.
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Id. (citations omitted). While looking at the hardship
necessarily involves ascertaining the future factual
consequences that would result from removal of the alien, it is
the degree of hardship that constitutes a legal question, namely,
whether it is “exceptional and extremely unusual.” Id. (citing
Matter of Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I & N Dec. 56 (BIA 2001)).
Returning to the trio of likelihoods in Kaplun’s case, the
BIA should have addressed the three questions as follows: (1)
the likelihood of Kaplun interacting with governmental
authorities on return to the Ukraine is a factual question; (2) the
likelihood of his being targeted for extortion and mistreatment
is also a factual question; and (3) whether the likely
mistreatment will amount to torture is a legal question.
Here—even though the BIA purported “not [to] find any facts
[itself,] but only assessed the facts as found by the Immigration
Judge and established by the evidence entered into the record,
determining that they were insufficient to meet [Kaplun]’s
burden of proof for protection under the Convention Against
Torture,” 24 I & N Dec. at 502—it appears that the BIA reexamined the record and conducted de novo fact-finding instead
of applying the clearly erroneous standard.9
9

On this record, we can assume only that the BIA applied
a de novo standard to all of the IJ’s relevant factual findings.
The BIA justified its reversal of the IJ by declaring it
“possess[ed] the authority to review de novo findings deemed by
an Immigration Judge to satisfy an ultimate statutory standard,”
24 I & N Dec. at 502, and at no point did it purport to apply the
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The IJ took testimony from an expert witness (his
qualifications and competency to testify are not challenged)
whose expert opinion was that Kaplun was likely to be detained
and imprisoned, and that the conditions of imprisonment would
constitute torture. The IJ credited the expert’s testimony and
concluded that Kaplun was likely to interact with governmental
entities. The IJ then found that there was a “extremely high”
likelihood this would make Kaplun a target for detention and
mistreatment with the acquiescence or consent of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity for the
current government of the Ukraine. Based on these factual
findings, the IJ made the legal conclusion that Kaplun’s likely
detention would constitute torture, distinguishing it from
situations where “it is somewhat problematic as to . . . whether
the level of [mistreatment] is likely to rise to the level of the
regulatory language . . . as to what constitutes torture.”
The BIA applied de novo review to the question of
whether there was a probability of torture, including the factual
findings of the IJ. Specifically, the BIA disagreed with the IJ
crediting “the [expert] witness’s statements regarding what
would happen in [Kaplun’s] specific situation” if he were
clearly erroneous standard to the underlying facts. Perhaps a
more precise (and correct) statement would be that the BIA
possesses the authority to review de novo whether an
Immigration Judge’s factual findings (that are not clearly
erroneous) satisfy an ultimate statutory standard (in this case,
torture).
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removed, dismissing it as “speculative.” This appears to have
been reversal of a factual finding under a de novo standard, an
impermissible BIA action.10 The BIA also disagreed with the
IJ’s factual finding that “public officials would consent or
acquiesce” to mistreatment of Kaplun, again appearing to make
a de novo reversal. It should have reviewed these factual
findings under a “clearly erroneous” standard, and the apparent
application of the incorrect standard of review was error. In
contrast, the BIA correctly applied a de novo standard of review
in determining whether the claimed discrimination or
mistreatment would constitute torture under the legal
framework.
We caution that we are not precluding BIA review of
facts found by the IJ. It is free to revisit the underlying facts
(including the likelihood of future events), but it must do so
under the clearly erroneous standard that applies to facts. This
review is important to the process of assuring that IJ-found facts
get proper deference.

10

Although terming an expert’s testimony “speculative”
may indicate that the BIA considered the factual findings to be
clearly erroneous, it did not say so. If it wishes to reverse
factual findings it believes are not “established by evidence
entered into the record,” 24 I & N Dec. at 502, it needs to apply
the clearly erroneous standard in such a way that reviewing
courts understand that standard to be in play.
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IV.

Conclusion

We hold that when the Government provides unrebutted
evidence of monetary loss in excess of $10,000 through an
information, a guilty plea to that information, a pre-sentence
report, and the documented lack of objection to that report, it has
proven the amount of loss by clear and convincing evidence for
the purpose of establishing an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1103(a)(43)(M)(i). We further hold that the BIA committed
no legal error in designating Kaplun’s aggravated felony to be
a “particularly serious crime” under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii), rendering him ineligible for withholding of
removal. Finally, we hold that the BIA erred in reviewing the
finding of a probability of torture de novo; it was required to
review the factual aspects of that inquiry for clear error, and it
was entitled to review only the legal aspects of the inquiry de
novo. Accordingly, we grant the petition for review and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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